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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a new regulatory concept, commonly referred to as a
"regulatory sandbox," has gained a great deal of attention from regulators,
regulatory scholars, and those engaged in the provision of financial services. 1
Firms within the sandbox usually receive some combination of reduced
regulatory burdens, limitations on regulatory liability, increased
communication with and advice from regulators, and expedited regulatory
decisions. 2 Regulatory sandboxes are perhaps most prevalent in the field of
financial technology, often referred to as "fintech." 3
The United Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) launched the
first regulatory sandbox centered around fintech in June of 2016 as part of its
initiative, Project Innovate. 4 Shortly thereafter, Singapore and Australia
implemented their own regulatory sandboxes aimed at promoting the creation
and development of fintech within their jurisdictions.5 Singapore has even
proposed implementing new regulatory sandboxes focused on fast-tracking
the approval process for experimental products as a way to complement its
existing sandbox. 6 In 2018, Arizona became the first jurisdiction, or
1. Ross P. Buckley et al., Building FinTech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes,
Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 56 (2019). Although regulatory
sandboxes can vary significantly in their design, these experimental regimes can generally be
defined as a decreed state of exception within a regulatory regime that allows firms to offer
products or services for a limited time to and a limited number of customers in a modified
regulatory environment for the purpose of allowing the firm to test a product or service before
it is offered more broadly. Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/X28N-J3FF] [hereinafter
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Regulatory Sandbox].
2.
U.N. SEC'Y-GEN.'S SPECIAL ADVOC. FOR INCLUSIVE FIN. FOR DEV. FINTECH
WORKING GROUP & CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALT. FIN., EARLY LESSONS ON REGULATORY
INNOVATIONS TO ENABLE INCLUSIVE FINTECH: INNOVATION OFFICES, REGULATORY

SANDBOXES, AND REGTECH 27, 32 (2019) [hereinafter UNSGSA].
3. Id. at 4, 28.
4.
5.

See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., RegulatorySandbox, supra note 1.
See Overview of Regulatory Sandbox, MONETARY

AUTH.

OF

SING.,

http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/FinTech-Regulato
ry-Sandbox.aspx [https://perma.cc/UDU9-BYPG]; FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SEC.
& INVS. COMM'N, https://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-hub/regulatorysandbox [https://perma.cc/U79X-PG9S].
6.
See MAS ProposesNew Regulatory Sandbox with Fast-TrackApprovals, MONETARY
AUTH. OF SING. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2018/masproposes-new-regulatory -sandbox-with-fasttrack-approvals [https://perma.cc/R5W7-J2NQ].
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regulatory body, within the United States to create a financial regulatory
sandbox. 7 Wyoming and Utah followed suit in 2019.8 Also in 2019, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)9 finalized its own proposal for
the first federal regulatory sandbox within the United States.10 More and
more, legislative and regulatory bodies are considering adopting regulatory
sandboxes to gain a competitive advantage for their jurisdictions by
encouraging entrepreneurialism and innovation within the financial sphere. 1
Although regulatory sandboxes have generated considerable excitement
among some policy scholars as a way to promote entrepreneurialism and

innovation while keeping regulatory oversight in place, concerns about their
soundness remain. 12 The most obvious concern is that sandboxes may pose a
risk to consumers or reflect a "race to the bottom." 13 Firms faced with reduced
liability or regulatory burden may be more likely to make risky decisions that
could ultimately harm consumers in the pursuit of profit. 14 This has been the
primary focus of the criticism leveled against regulatory sandboxes. 15
However, sandboxes pose another risk that has not received the same
level of attention within the literature or public discourse. In addition to
promoting innovation within the financial sphere, regulatory sandboxes have
7.
Press Release, Ariz. Att'y Gen., Arizona Becomes First State in U.S. to Offer Fintech
Regulatory Sandbox (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.azag.gov/press-release/arizona-becomesfirst-state-us-offer-fintech-regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/8D3E-9AED].
8.
Anthony C. Kaye, Wyoming Creates FintechSandbox, NAT'L L. REV. (June 6, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/wyoning-creates-fintech-sandbox [https://perma.cc/3D
ZQ-U89J]; Allen S. Li, Utah Passes the Third State-Run "Sandbox"for Innovative Financial

Productsand Services, NAT'L L. REV. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
utah-passes-third-state-run-sandbox-innovative-financial-products-and-services [https://perma.
cc/D7KS-9HRJ].
9.
Debate exists within the Bureau over whether it is called the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) or the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP), but both
names refer to the same entity. This Article will refer to the Bureau as the CFPB.
10. CFPB IssuesPolicies to FacilitateComplianceandPromote Innovation, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
bureau-issues-policies-facilitate-compliance-promote-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/3HBX-LQ
JZ]; Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,247 (Sept. 13,
2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
11.

See, e.g., DELOITTE CTR. FOR REGUL. STRATEGY EMEA, A JOURNEY THROUGH THE

FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX 1 (2018) [hereinafter DELOITTE]; UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55104(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5602
(Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg. 2020).
12. Linda Jun et al., Comment Letter on No-Action Letters and Product Sandbox (Feb.
11, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/ document?D=CFPB-2018-0042-0026 (last visited Oct.
30, 2020).
13. Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579,622 (2019). One
public comment filed by a collection of consumer advocacy groups referred to the CFPB's
"protections." Jun et al., supra note 12, at 2.
14. Jun et al., supra note 12, at 1.
15. See, e.g., id.
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the potential to give certain economic privileges to specific firms without
extending those same privileges to other, similarly situated firms. 16 Typically,
regulators approve and allow only certain finrms, or types of firms, to
participate in their sandbox. 7 Because regulatory sandboxes, by design,
reduce the regulatory costs that an admitted firm incurs, firms approved to
participate in the sandbox may receive an advantage over their nonapproved

competitors. This presents something of a paradox for policy makers: for a
regulatory sandbox to be effective, it must offer participants some form of
regulatory relief, but this relief may provide firms with government-granted

economic privilege at the expense of their rivals. This concern is an aspect of
regulatory sandboxes that, so far, has been underexamined.
Critical analyses of regulatory sandboxes are almost always based on a
concern for consumer protection.18 The goal of this Article is to look at the
structure of regulatory sandboxes and examine both the possible sources of
government-granted economic privilege and the potential costs associated
with this privilege. This Article then proposes best practices that policy
makers can use to reduce the potential for economic privilege and mitigate the
costs associated with it. This Article does not argue that the risk of economic
privilege outweighs the benefits created by regulatory sandboxes-the
balance of that equation is context dependent, and a well-designed and wellexecuted sandbox could indeed provide significant benefits to consumers and
competitors. What this Article does contend, however, is that the risk of
economic privilege exists and should be thoroughly considered as regulatory
sandboxes become more and more prevalent. Given that regulatory sandboxes
are so new, there are limited data available to assess whether these risks are
in fact occurring. This Article therefore seeks to flag potential dangers that
policy makers, market participants, and researchers should consider.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the current regulatory
sandboxes that exist in various jurisdictions, both inside and outside of the
United States, and the aspects of their design that have an effect on the
potential for government-granted privilege. Specifically, Part I focuses on the

16. Similar issues have been identified regarding the somewhat analogous "special
economic zones" that have been created within the past several decades. See, e.g., Lotta Moberg,
The Political Economy of Special Economic Zones, 11 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 167, 167

(2015).
17.

See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to

Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 45-46 (2017).
18. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 8; Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed.
Reg. 48,246, 48,251 (Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.); Jun et al., supra note 12, at

1.
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regulatory sandboxes already established in the United Kingdom, Australia, 19
Arizona, Utah, and by the CFPB. Part II analyzes the ways in which these
regulatory sandboxes have the potential to create economic privilege for
certain firms or industries. Part III discusses the potential costs associated with
this economic privilege, including the notions of fairness and justice, the
effect of economic privilege on market signals and competition, and the
potential it creates for cronyism and favoritism. Part IV considers the ways in
which regulators might mitigate these potential costs and the risk of cronyism.
It also details best practices that regulators could follow to mitigate this risk.
Finally, Part V concludes this Article.
II.

WHAT ARE REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND HOW DO THEY WORK?

A.

What Is a Regulatory Sandbox?

The term "regulatory sandbox" is a broad concept that encapsulates a
wide variety of newly emerging regulatory regimes, primarily in the financial

sector. Its precise definition varies, depending on the jurisdiction using it and
the regulatory regime it has created. 20 For the purposes of this Article, a
regulatory sandbox is a legal construct that allows firms to offer products or
services for a limited time and to a limited number of customers in a modified
regulatory environment so that those firms can test a product or service before
it is offered more broadly.21
Regulatory sandboxes differ from general regulatory reform in that the
relief a sandbox provides applies only to specific firms on a case-by-case basis
and is in effect only for a limited time. 22 Additionally, sandboxes frequently
include an expectation of increased transparency, in which the regulator is
able to monitor or review participating firms' actions and progress as a way

to learn; broad, rules-based changes do not generally provide such an
opportunity. 23 Fast learning and course correction are two of the greater
19. As of September 1, 2020, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission
(ASIC) introduced significant modifications to its regulatory sandbox program. This Article
primarily describes the sandbox as it existed prior to these changes because it contained several
unique elements compared to most other regulatory sandboxes. Info 248 EnhancedRegulatory
Sandbox, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, https://asic.gov.au/for-business/innovation-hub/enhan
ced-regulatory-sandbox/info-248-enhanced-regulatory-sandbox/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020)
[hereinafter ASIC, Info 248]. While many of the changes made by the ASIC merely expand or
modify existing requirements, this Article includes a discussion of some of the more material
changes to the ASIC sandbox implemented in September of 2020. See infra notes 29, 45, 83,
102, 107, 118, and accompanying text.
20. UNSGSA, supra note 2, at 19, 26.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Zetzsche et al., supra note 17, at 75.
23. See UNSGSA, supra note 2, at 15.
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potential virtues of regulatory sandboxes, where adjustments by firms and
regulators can be quickly implemented to enhance the public interest.
B.

How Do Regulatory Sandboxes Work?

Although regulatory sandbox designs vary across jurisdictions, they
frequently share certain common criteria.24 Where there is differentiation
among jurisdictions, that may be the result of differing policy preferences or
differences in the administrative bodies' authority. The relief a regulatory
body offers is constrained by the relief it is empowered to offer. This Section
discusses the common criteria and processes found in sandboxes, as well as
their variations. It also analyzes a variety of different sandboxes, including the
U.K. FCA's Project Innovate sandbox; the Australian Securities Investments

Commission's (ASIC) Fintech Licensing Exemption, which operated from
December of 2016 until September of 2020, as well as some material changes

introduced in the ASIC's new, enhanced regulatory sandbox; Arizona's
fntech sandbox, administered by the Arizona Attorney General's Office;
Utah's regulatory sandbox, administered by the Utah Department of
Commerce; and the CFPB's Compliance Assistance Sandbox (CAS).
1.

Sandbox Purpose

Jurisdictions create regulatory sandboxes to further specific policy
objectives. 2 5 While the purposes for these sandboxes are frequently similar
across jurisdictions, especially with regard to the goal of encouraging
innovation, differences may arise from the mandates placed on various
regulators overseeing the sandboxes, as well as from the economic and policy
goals of different jurisdictions. 26
a.

Innovation

Unsurprisingly, encouraging entrepreneurialism and innovation is one of

the most frequently cited goals for regulatory sandboxes. 27 For example, the
FCA established its sandbox in part to support "disruptive innovation" in the
financial services market by helping reduce the regulatory uncertainty that the

24. See id at 21.
25. See id at 22, 28.
26. See id at 28.
27. Id. at 22, 58.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss2/7

6

Knight and Mitchell: The Sandbox Paradox: Balancing the Need to Facilitate Innovation
THE SANDBOX PARADOX

2020]

451

FCA believes inhibit the ability of innovative products to reach the market.28
Likewise, the ASIC's Innovation Hub project, which included its sandbox,
sought to "foster innovation that could benefit consumers by helping
Australian [Fintech] startups navigate [Australia's] regulatory system." 29 The
ASIC's new, enhanced regulatory sandbox does not include (or renounce) the
old language, but it does explicitly require the product or service being tested
to meet an innovation test. 30 Arizona similarly established its sandbox to
"encourage businesses to develop innovative products and services in the
financial services sector." 31 By the same token, Utah created its sandbox to
attract "innovative products and services to Utah's financial services
sector." 32 Finally, the CFPB pursued its CAS in part to further its mission to
"facilitate access and innovation" when it comes to financial services. 33
b.

Consumer Benefit and Protection

Of course, innovation is not an end in itself but rather a means to obtaining
the benefits that emanate from innovation. One of those benefits is consumer
protection either from harmful or substandard products or from the harms that
result from a lack of access to financial services. 34 The FCA believes that its
sandbox will benefit consumers by facilitating "an increased range of products
and services, reduced costs, and improved access to financial services." 35
Likewise, the ASIC's original sandbox arose from the agency's commitment
to "encourage[e] and facilitate[e] innovation in financial services and credit
where this is likely to produce good outcomes for investors and financial

consumers." 36 Arizona's sandbox intends to help foster "innovation aimed at
28. Christopher Woolard, Fin. Conduct Auth. Dir. of Strategy & Competition, Regulating
for Innovation, Speech Delivered at the Financial Conduct Authority's Event on UK FinTech
(Feb. 22, 2016), in FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeche
s/uk-fintech-regulating-innovation [https://perma.cc/9KCE-RCDL].
29. Crowd-SourcedFunding, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, https://asic.gov.au/regulato
ry -resources/financial-services/crowd-sourced-funding/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
30. See ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.
31.

Frequently Asked Questions: Why Was the Sandbox Created?, ARIZ. ATT'Y GEN.,

https://www.azag.gov/fintech/faq [https://perma.cc/NN85-QXAX] [ARIz. ATT'Y GEN., FA Qs].
32. Regulatory Sandbox: FrequentlyAsked Questions, STATE OF UTAH DEP'T OF COM.,
https://commerce.utah.gov/sandbox.html [https://perma.cc/266B-3RAK] [hereinafter UTAH
DEP'T OF COM., FAQs].

33. See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,255
(Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
34. Id. at 48,251.
35. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX 5 (2015) [hereinafter FIN. CONDUCT
AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX].
36. AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, REGULATORY GUIDE 257.1, TESTING FINTECH
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENSE (2017) (emphasis

added) [hereinafter ASIC, REGULATORY GUIDE].
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making financial products and services more available, affordable, and safe

for consumers."37 Utah's sandbox requires applicants to describe how their
product will benefit consumers as a criterion for evaluation when firms seek
entry to the sandbox. 38 For its part, the CFPB explicitly justifies its CAS on
the grounds that innovation leads to several benefits for consumers, 39
including increased competition, lower prices, and access to more and better
financial services. 40 In all of these cases, innovation intends to bring about
benefits and protections for consumers.
c.

RegulatoryAccess and Knowledge Sharing

Another goal that drives the creation of sandboxes is their potential to
gain access to innovations early in their life cycles, permitting regulators to
gain a better understanding of the products and services they are tasked with
regulating and giving them the ability to encourage "responsible"
development. 4 1 This access is obtained through communication with and
supervision of entrepreneurs that the sandbox structure usually provides. 42
The FCA notes that its sandbox allows the FCA to work with firms and ensure
that their products and services are built with appropriate consumer
protections before they are released more broadly. 43 The ASIC operated its
original sandbox somewhat differently from most other examples. 44 It
requested that firms using the sandbox submit an after-action report, in part to
help the ASIC identify "key risks or issues faced by testing businesses and
consumers." 45 The new ASIC sandbox retains this requirement.46
d.

Industry Support and Economic Development

Sandboxes can be established with a variety of different goals. Many of
these goals aim to benefit consumers, either directly through more and better
products or indirectly through a more educated and effective regulator. 47
Other sandboxes are explicitly aimed at supporting the development of the
fintech industry; specific types of firms within the fintech industry, such as
37. See ARIz. ATT'Y GEN., FAQs, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
38. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55-103(3)(f)(ii) (West, Westlaw current through 2020 5th
Spec. Sess.).
39. Id.
40. See id
41. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 17, at 102.
42. Id. at 78; see UNSGSA, supra note 2, at 30; Allen, supra note 13, at 580, 614-16.
43. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., RegulatorySandbox, supra note 1.

44.
45.
46.
47.

See supra Section II.B.1.b.
See ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.
See id
See UNSGSA, supra note 2, at 10, 30.
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nonbank money transmitters and online lenders; and economic development
more generally. 48
Directly supporting innovative firms by helping accelerate their paths to
market and attract investors serves as an explicit justification for the sandbox
in some jurisdictions. 49 For example, the FCA's sandbox is justified in part
by the FCA's desire to help provide innovative firms with a way to reach the
market at a lower cost and receive improved access to investment.5 0 On this
latter point, the FCA notes that regulatory uncertainty can serve as a barrier to
firms obtaining investment and can lead to lower valuations because investors
have to consider regulatory risk, which is difficult for them to assess.5 1 When
the sandbox is able to reduce this regulatory risk for a specific firm, it
increases the firm's value for a potential investor as the firm no longer has to
bear the compliance costs associated with that risk.52 The ASIC also views
improving innovative firms' speed to market and access to capital as goals of
its sandbox. 53 It believes that a lack of access to capital can become a
consumer protection issue to the extent that a lack of funds forces firms to
race to market without taking the steps necessary to confirm they are actually
ready to (1) operate their business in a safe and appropriate manner or (2) hire

individuals with adequate experience and competence.54
Regulators also use sandboxes to make their jurisdiction more attractive
to potential finrms, with the expectation that the sandbox will result in more
jobs and tax revenue within their jurisdiction. 55 The FCA views its sandbox
as a tool to "ensure that [the United Kingdom] continue[s] to be an attractive
market [for innovative financial firms] with an appropriate regulatory
framework."5 6 Arizona established its sandbox in part to "encourage
businesses to develop innovative products and services in the financial
services sector [in Arizona]" and to "sen[d] a strong message that Arizona is
leading the way in fostering innovation aimed at making financial products
and services more available, affordable, and safe for consumers." 57 Likewise,
Utah cited a desire to attract "innovative products and services to Utah's
financial services sector."5 8

48.
49.

See id. at7.
See id. at 32.

50. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., RegulatorySandbox, supra note 1.
51. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX LESSONS LEARNED REPORT 3,
16 (2017) [hereinafter FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LESSONS LEARNED].

52.

See id. at 16.

53. See ASIC, REGULATORY GUIDE, supra note 36.

54.
55.

See id
Allen, supranote 13, at 611.

56.

FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 35, at 5.
ARIZ. ATT'Y GEN., FA Qs, supra note 31.
See UTAH DEP'T OF COM., FAQs, supra note 32.

57.
58.
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This support for the industry has borne fruit in some cases. 59 For example,
the FCA reported that "at least 40% of firms [that] completed testing in the
first cohort received investment during or following their sandbox tests." 60
Further, firms that went through the FCA sandbox appear to enjoy "a greater
degree of legitimacy with customers and investors alike." 6 1 However,
participation in a sandbox is not a guarantee of success, as evidenced by the
fact that a nontrivial number of firms that used sandboxes ended up failing or
becoming insolvent. 62
2.

Entry Criteriaand Process

Sandboxes are limited regulatory environments that apply only in certain
circumstances to further their stated purposes. 63 As such, entry is usually
predicated on some sort of criteria that firms need to meet in order to qualify. 64
Unsurprisingly, these criteria are generally tied to the underlying purpose of
the sandbox, but they can also reflect other concerns, such as the need to
preserve scarce regulatory resources. 65 Entry criteria present an important

inflection point for the risk that the sandbox will become a source of undue
regulatory advantage because an excessively exclusory set of criteria makes
it more likely that a sandbox will underserve its relevant market and extend
its benefits too narrowly.
a.

Firm Characteristics

Different jurisdictions place varying requirements on firms that seek to
enter the sandbox. 66 The FCA sandbox, for example, is open exclusively to
FCA-regulated firms, firms normally regulated by the FCA but lacking a
license, and service providers of FCA-regulated firms. 67 The ASIC opens its
new, enhanced regulatory sandbox to "[u]nlicensed Australian businesses[,]"
"[l]ocally registered unlicensed foreign companies[,]" and "licensed

59.

See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 51, at 5-7

(noting indicators of success).
60. Id. at 6.
61. DELOITTE, supra note 11, at 7.
62. See Buckley et al., supra note 1, at 57.
63. See id. at 59.
64. See id. at 58.
65. See id. at 59.
66. See id. at 61, 63-64.
67. Applying to the Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June 16, 2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/prepare-application [https://perma.cc/LK3S7NVL] [hereinafter FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Applying to the Regulatory Sandbox].
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businesses testing new services they are currently [unauthorized] to
provide[.]"68
Arizona requires that firms be subject to the Arizona attorney general's
jurisdiction and have a "physical or virtual" location accessible to the attorney
general's office where testing will be conducted and records will be
maintained. 69 Utah, likewise, opens its sandbox to firms that are subject to
Utah's jurisdiction, that have a physical office within Utah where testing will
be conducted and where a repository for books and records will be located,
and that meet certain requirements with regard to its management team and
ability to adequately conduct testing. 70 The CFPB does not impose specific
requirements on the types of firms that can apply for its sandbox, although
they must presumably either be subject to the CFPB's jurisdiction or intend to
work with firms that are.7 1
b.

ProductCharacteristics

Much like jurisdictions place requirements on firms for admission, most
jurisdictions also require that products meet certain characteristics before they
can be tested in their regulatory sandbox. 72 Limiting the type of products that
can be tested may be a result of limits in the regulator's jurisdiction, specific
policy objectives (e.g., a desire to attract certain types of businesses or

concerns about consumer protection), or efforts to conserve scarce regulatory
resources.73

Many of the requirements placed on products are not controversial. For
example, the FCA requires that a product seeking to enter the sandbox be "in
scope[,]" which means it is the type of product an FCA-regulated company

would offer or purchase. 74 Likewise, the CFPB's sandbox is broad as to what
types of products can be tested. 75 Conversely, Arizona limits its sandbox to
"money transmission, consumer lending, and investment advice[.]" 7 6 The
68.

Comparison ofKey Featuresof the ASIC Sandbox and the Australian Government's

EnhancedRegulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM'N 1, https://download.asic.gov/au/
media/5763623/comparison-asic-sandbox-enhanced-regulatory-sandbox-published-2 5-august2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3TT-B8HK] [hereinafter ASIC, Comparison ofKey Features].
69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5603(C)(2) (Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of
54th Leg.).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55-103(3)(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec.
Sess.).
71. See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,247,
48,251-52 (Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
72. See Buckley et al., supranote 1, at 61-62; UNSGSA, supra note 2, at 21.
73. Buckley et al., supra note 1, at 63.
74. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Applying to the Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 67.
75. Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,252.
76. Buckley et al., supra note 1, at 64.
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FCA additionally requires that the product be in a position to be tested.7" All
this makes sense. Accepting a product outside of the regulator's jurisdiction
would be a waste of the regulator's resources and the firm's time because the
regulator would not be in a position to grant meaningful relief or gain useful
knowledge from the experiment.
Other criteria can be more controversial and potentially problematic. For
example, the FCA, Australia, Arizona, and Utah all require that a product be
innovative to qualify for admission to the sandbox.7 8 The definition of
"innovative" varies by jurisdiction. 79 The FCA favors products that are new
or significantly different from those currently offered and disfavors products
that have numerous comparable competitors. 80 Arizona and Utah also look to
whether there are comparable products widely available within their state. 81
Additionally, they both require the innovation to have either new technology
or new use of an existing technology. 82 The ASIC's original sandbox regime

expected firms to be new and innovative and excluded firms whose products
were insufficiently innovative or failed to use technology adequately. 83 As of
September 2020, however, the ASIC imposed a formal innovation test under
which it evaluates an applicant prior to accessing the regulatory sandbox to
determine whether the applicant's product or service is sufficiently innovative
to qualify for sandbox relief 84 Depending on how strictly the technology and
uniqueness requirements are interpreted, there is a risk that innovative but
non-first mover firms might be blocked from entry. Further, this requirement

empowers regulators to determine just what counts as "innovative," a decision
they are likely ill-equipped to evaluate.8 5

In contrast, the CFPB's sandbox does not contain a technological
component when it considers whether a product is eligible; 86 nor does it
appear to require that the product be unique. 87 In fact, when a substantially

similar product exists, the CFPB allows for an applicant to seek "compliance

77. See DELOITTE, supra note 11, at 3.
78. See id.; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-5603(A) (Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.
of 54th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55-104(1) (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.);
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 1; ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.

79. See, e.g., § 41-5601(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55-102(7).
80. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Applying to the Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 67.
81. § 41-5601(4); § 13-55-102(7).
82. § 41-5601(4); § 13-55-102(7).
83. See ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.
84. Id.
85. See Buckley et al., supra note 1, at 61-63.
86. Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,251-52,
48,259 (Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
87. See id. at 48,251-52 (listing the evaluation criteria for application, which do not
include a uniqueness component).
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assistance based on public information" on the existing product.88 Utah
created a similar provision whereby if a competitor is participating in the

sandbox, this favors a firm's admission. 89
Many sandboxes also impose a limit on the number of consumers that can
access the product. 90 For example, the FCA negotiates limits with a firm at
the time of application, 9 1 and Arizona limits the number of customers, the size
of individual transactions, and the size of aggregate transactions per customer
that the firm may have while within the sandbox. 92 Meanwhile, Utah grants
its regulator the discretion to set limits on the number of customers allowed
to experiment with a specific sandboxed product and to establish dollar limits
the firm must adhere to. 93
c.

Entry Process

The FCA, Arizona, Utah, and the CFPB all require that firms submit an
application to access their respective sandboxes. 94 As part of the application
process, the firm is generally required to provide details about itself; the
product or service it seeks to test; the type of questions or regulatory

uncertainty it seeks to address through the use of the sandbox; how the product
can benefit consumers; what form of regulatory relief or clarity the firm seeks;
and how the firm plans to protect consumers. 95
Once a firm submits an application, the regulator evaluates it. 96
Regulators in Arizona, in Utah, and at the CFPB must review and decide on
the application within a limited time frame (ninety days for Arizona and Utah,
with the possibility of a mutually agreed upon extension 97 and sixty days for
the CFPB, with the understanding that extenuating circumstances may
increase the time required). 98 Regulators generally have broad discretion as to

88. Id. at 48,259.
89. UTAH CODE ANN.
90.

§

13-55-103(10) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec. Sess.).

See DELOITTE, supra note 11, at 4; FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., RegulatorySandbox, supra

note 1; see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
91.

§

13-55-104(2)(b).

See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 1.

92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5605(B)(3), (B)(4), (C)(2) (Westlaw through 2020 2d
Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg.).
93. § 13-55-104(2)(b)-(d).
94. See DELOITTE, supra note 11, at 3; § 41-5601(7); § 13-55-103(3); Policy on the
Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,247 (Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R.).
95. See DELOITTE, supra note 11, at 3; § 41-5603(F)(1)-(3); § 13-55-103(3)(f)(i)-(viii);
Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,256.
96. See DELOITTE, supra note 11, at 3; § 41-5603(B); § 13-55-103(9)(a); Policy on the
Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,247.
97. § 41-5603(I); § 13-55-103(7)-(8).
98. See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,247.
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whether to grant an application, 99 although Utah at least requires the regulator
to provide a written description of its reasons for rejection. 100
d.

Australia as a Limited Exception

The original ASIC sandbox differed considerably from the FCA, Arizona,
Utah, and CFPB sandboxes in that it did not require the regulator to approve
a firm before the firm could take advantage of the sandbox. 10 1 As Dirk
Zetzsche and his coauthors argue, the ASIC "sandbox" may have served, at
least in part, as more of a "class waiver" for a broad swath of fintech firms
that met certain criteria, rather than as a traditional sandbox. 102 In fact, the
ASIC's new, enhanced regulatory sandbox explicitly states that the sandbox
acts as a "class waiver from licensing for certain financial services and credit
activities." 103 In addition to programs that provide firm-specific relief, the
ASIC's Fintech Licensing Exemption formerly allowed qualifying finrms to
test certain products in the market for a limited period of time without
obtaining a license that would otherwise be required. 104
Although the ASIC's Fintech Licensing Exemption lacked a front-loaded
application process, a firm was still required to notify the ASIC if it intended
to take advantage of the exemption and to provide information showing it met
the necessary qualifications. 105 This requirement included information on the
firm's business model, management, insurance coverage, and membership in
a dispute resolution regime. 106 Further, despite the ASIC's Fintech Licensing

Exemption lacking the firm-by-firm discretion of other sandboxes, it had more
proscriptive requirements that firms had to satisfy, including limiting the
number of customers and amount of value transacted, requiring the firm to

99. Id.; § 41-5603(J); § 13-55-103(12)(a).
100. § 13-55-103(12)(b).
101. See ASIC Releases World-FirstLicensing Exemption for Fintech Businesses, AUSTL.
SEC & INVS. COMM'N (2016), https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/
2016-releases/16-440mr-asic-releases-world-first-licensing-exemption-for-fintech-businesses/
[https://perma.cc/7KZE-GG6V] [hereinafter ASIC, World-First Licensing Exemption]; cf
DELOITTE, supra note 61, at 2-3; § 41-5603(I); § 13-55-103(9)(a); Policy on the Compliance
Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,247.
102. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 82-83
103. ASIC Issues Guidancefor Government'sEnhancedRegulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SEC
& INVS. COMM'N, https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2020-release
s/20 -195 mr-asic-issues-guidance-for-govemment-s-enhanced-regulatoy -sandbox/ [https://per

ma.cc/8AQN-EAQA].
104. ASIC, Comparison ofKey Features, supra note 68.
105. See id.
106. ASIC, REGULATORY GUIDE, supra note 36, at 257.113-14.
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have adequate resources to compensate customers in the event of mishap, and
mandating the firm to make certain disclosures to customers. 107
As of September 2020, the ASIC modified the entry requirements for its
enhanced regulatory sandbox.108 While the new, enhanced ASIC sandbox is
still primarily a notification system, it now requires firms seeking access to
submit a prescribed notification form to the ASIC and have their product or
service satisfy certain eligibility requirements.109 This includes the firm
leadership's character and fitness as well as the net public benefit and
innovative nature of a product or service, which is determined by two formal
tests. 11 0 While these requirements are similar to the ASIC's previous
requirements, the new regime allows the ASIC staff to block a firm from
taking advantage of the sandbox if the firm fails to meet the entry criteria.I
The ASIC staff has thirty days to notify the firm. 112 If it fails to notify within
30 days, the firm can begin to take advantage of the sandbox, though the ASIC
staff can remove the firm at any time for failing to meet criteria.11 3
3.

Relief Offered

The type of relief a sandbox will offer depends on the policy goals that
led to its establishment, as well as the powers held by the administering
regulator.11 4 For example, the FCA operates with broad authority as both a
licensing and conduct regulator with a competition mandate.11 5 Therefore, the
FCA can offer multiple forms of relief, ranging from restricted authorization
(a sort of learner's permit) to no-action letters, rule waivers and modifications,
and individual guidance. 116 The former ASIC Fintech Licensing Exemption
served to remove the need-at least temporarily-for a license to allow firms
107. ASIC, Comparison ofKey Features,supra note 68.
108. ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., UTAH DEP'T OF COM., FAQs, supra note 32; UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55103(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec. Sess.); About Us, STATE OF UTAH DEP'T OF
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/F5WD-F2GA]
COM., https://commerce.utah.gov/about.html
UTAH DEP'T COM., About Us].

115. How We Authorise, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Apr. 5, 2016) https://www.fca.org.uk/abo
ut/how-we-authorise [https://perma.cc/F7LH-ULSJ] [hereinafter FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., How
We Authorise]; Enforcement, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/
about/enforcement [https://perma.cc/WK63-CDF6]
[hereinafter FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
Enforcement].
116. Sandbox Tools, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/
innovation/regulatory-sandbox-tools
[https://perma.cc/UR49-QW7A]
[hereinafter FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH., Sandbox Tools].
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Additionally, the ASIC offered other

forms of relief, such as a waiver of certain rules and regulations.1 1 8 The

ASIC's new, enhanced regulatory sandbox appears to contemplate providing
similar relief. 119 Conversely, both Arizona and Utah explicitly state they will
not provide firms with legal advice. 120 Rather, relevant regulators in Arizona
and Utah provide firms with a limited license to test their products or
services.121

Although the FCA, the ASIC, Arizona, and Utah are all licensing bodies
and can therefore offer limited-access licenses or temporarily waive the
licensing requirement, the CFPB does not license firms. 122 As such, it cannot
provide a limited-purpose license. 123 Instead, the CFPB provides firms with a
Compliance Assistance Statement of Terms (CAST) that extends CFPB
approval for a particular offering, provided it meets the requirements
stipulated in the CAST. 124 Approval means that the CFPB believes the product
or service is in compliance with the law and that the firm will have a safe
harbor from liability so long as it remains in compliance with the requirements
set forth in the CAST. 125
An additional limitation to the scope of relief that can be offered exists
when there are regulators with overlapping jurisdictions. 126 For example, a

firm obtaining relief from the Arizona or Utah sandbox will still need to worry
about federal regulators, including the CFPB, because Arizona and Utah
cannot bind the federal government. 127 Although the CFPB has a process for
entering into agreements with other jurisdictions and plans to coordinate with
117. ASIC, Comparison ofKey Features,supra note 68.
118. Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm'n, Retaining ASIC's Fintech Licensing Exemption 7
(Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm'n, Consultation Paper No. 297, 2017), https://download.asic.gov.au/
media/4570456/cp297-published-12 -december-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FQV-7X4U].
119. ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.
120. See UTAH DEP'T OF COM., FAQs, supra note 32; ARIZ. ATT'Y, GEN., FAQs, supra

note 31.
121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55-103(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec. Sess.);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5602 (Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg.).
122. See The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov
/about-us/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/7NFU-57RS]; FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., How We
Authorise, supra note 115; Powers, AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM'N, https://asic.gov.au/aboutasic/what-we-do/our-role/powers/ [https://perma.cc/6PP8-K7ZQ]; UTAH DEP'T COM., About
Us, supra note 114; Business Licensing, ARIZ. COM. AUTH., https://www.azcommerce.com/sma
ll-business/quick-links/business-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/ZH9K-NMZF].
123. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 122.

124. See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,257
(Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
125. Id. at 48,256.
126. See § 41-5603(F); § 13-55-104(5); Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84
Fed. Reg. at 48,249.
127. See § 41-5603(F); § 13-55-104(5); Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84
Fed. Reg. at 48,249.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss2/7

16

Knight and Mitchell: The Sandbox Paradox: Balancing the Need to Facilitate Innovation
THE SANDBOX PARADOX

2020]

461

other regulatory bodies for the purposes of its CAS, 128 there is no guarantee it
will. 129
C.

PotentialCosts of Regulatory Sandboxes

Regulatory sandboxes have been adopted to obtain certain potential gains,
but they also pose risks and costs. Although some cost is inevitable because
administering a sandbox requires scarce regulatory resources, other potential
risks, such as risks to consumer protection, are more speculative or susceptible
to mitigation. 130 This Section briefly discusses some of the potential costs of
regulatory sandboxes.
1.

Taxing Scarce Regulatory Resources

Regulatory sandboxes are generally "high touch" affairs in which the
regulator and participating firms engage in significant interaction.

13 1

This

interaction requires adequate staffing and resources, with sandboxes typically
taking six months and significant staff time to develop. 132 Sandbox staff can
also become overwhelmed by applications and requests when there is strong
demand from the market. 133 Concerns have been raised that regulatory
sandboxes will cause regulators to divert resources that could be better
deployed elsewhere, such as on more general innovation hubs. 134
2.

Consumer Protection

Concerns also have been raised that regulatory sandboxes will become
"consumer protection desert[s,]" 135 where consumers will lose the protection
of regulation and be left vulnerable. 136 Regulators may also misjudge the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,259-60.
Id.
See infra Section II.C.
See ASIC, Info 248, supra note 45.
UNSGSA, supra note 20, at 31.
Id.
Id. at 31-32.

135. See Lauren Saunders, Are Fintech Sandboxes a Consumer ProtectionDesert?, THE

HILL (Nov. 29, 2018), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/418770-Arefintech-sandboxes-a-consumer-protection-desert%3F [https://penma.cc/BKG6-RLTE].
136. See Jun et al., supra note 12, at 2; see also State of N.Y. Off. of the Att'y Gen.,
Comment Letter on Policy on No-Action Letters and the BCFP Product Sandbox 2 (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2018-0042-0031 [https://perma.cc/C7
PA-KJE4] ("The Proposed Policies do not reflect [a cautious and deliberative regulatory]
approach. Instead, they would permit the CFPB to exempt in some cases indefinitely
companies and even entire industries from certain consumer protection laws and regulations
through a process designed to value speed over careful decision-making.").
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success of an experiment and allow an unduly risky product into the market. 137
Further, there is concern that sandboxes may lead to a race to the bottom
where, in an effort to become more attractive to innovative firms, jurisdictions
progressively expand the scope of the sandbox and reduce the amount of
regulations that apply within.138 How much of a risk this actually is has yet to
be determined. Many sandbox regimes, including those discussed earlier,
explicitly include consumer protection concerns in their requirements for
entry. 139 For example, Australia requires that firms carry adequate insurance
to compensate consumers who are harmed, 140 and Arizona and Utah require
firms to detail how they will protect consumers in the event of a failure. 141
How effective these requirements will be depends on the quality of the
regulators' execution.
III. THE RISK OF ECONOMIC PRIVILEGE IN REGULATORY SANDBOXES

As described earlier, leading regulatory sandboxes seek to make it easier
for firms to test new products and services, with the goal of encouraging
competition, innovation, and access within the financial sector. 142 Regulatory
sandboxes work toward this goal by granting specific firms authorization to
test new products and services without having to go through the traditional
licensing process by either waiving certain legal and regulatory requirements
or limiting the firms' potential legal liability. 143 Although promoting

entrepreneurialism and innovation in a sector burdened by heavily restrictive
regulatory requirements is in the public interest, it also presents a potential
public problem. What happens to firms that are not admitted into the sandbox?
In a competitive market, a benefit granted to one firm may be a blow to
that firm's competitors. Firms typically compete with each other for market
power, so a benefit that makes it easier or cheaper for one firm to obtain a
larger share of the market is ultimately a detriment to its competitors.
137. See Jun, supra note 12, at 3.
138. Jemima Kelly, A "Fintech Sandbox" Might Sound Like a Harmless Idea. It's Not,
ALPHAVILLE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/05/1543986004000/A-fintech-sandbox--might-sound-like-a-harmless-idea--It-s-not/
[https://perma.cc/PSU7-NRCN]
("Worryingly, there now appears to be a kind of race to the bottom among global regulators to
set up the most 'light-touch' possible regimes so as to attract start-ups to their jurisdictions
whether they are offering consumers and investors anything useful. Sandboxes are a part of
that.").
139. See ASIC,Info 248, supra note 19; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5603(F)(3), (F)(3)(g)
(Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-55-103(3)(f),
(3)(f)(viii) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec. Sess.).
140. ASIC, Info 248, supra note 19.
141. § 41-5603(F)(3), (F)(3)(g); § 13-55-103(3)(f), (3)(f)(viii).
142. See supra Section II.B.1.
143. See supra Sections II.A.-II.B.L.d.
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Therefore, any time a regulator helps a specific firm, it potentially harms other
firms within the industry that did not receive that same benefit. 144
This is not just a problem for the admitted firm's competitors; it also
harms overall market competition, which, in turn, can reduce consumer
benefits. Additionally, when the government allows only one firm to
experiment with a particular product or service, it gives that firm-at least for
a limited time-monopolistic control over that product or service, which can
lead to worse outcomes for consumers. 145 Herein lies the paradox: To make a
sandbox worthwhile, it must provide some benefits to the firms operating
within it. However, those benefits may confer a competitive advantage to the
sandbox firms over their competitors, which could be detrimental to market
competition in the sector and, ultimately, to consumers.
The exact nature of the potential advantage will depend on the structure
of the sandbox and the advantages it offers. For example, making it easier for
Firm A to obtain a limited-use license for testing a new product or service
could harm incumbent Firm B, which was not able to obtain the limited-use
license. Firm B would then be compelled to spend the time, money, and effort
necessary to obtain a full license. All the while, Firm A would already be
establishing a customer base and gaining what is commonly referred to as the
"first-mover advantage."

146

This, in turn, would redirect Firm B's investment

resources that could have been spent on research and development or
marketing. Although at a fixed point in time, Firm B may seem to have the
advantage as an incumbent, Firm A's smoother entry point may lead to a long-

term advantage.
To the extent sandbox entry is limited on the basis of the innovative nature
or novelty of a product or service-the regulatory sandboxes established by
Australia and Arizona, as examples-a new firm that competes in a space but
offers a more traditional product may not be able to get a testing license. This
would give a marked advantage to firms that seek to offer new, innovative

144. As Christopher Coyne and Lotta Moberg have articulated in the context of stateprovided targeted economic benefits generally, "Targeted benefits are valuable to firms because
of their discriminatory nature[:] they give the recipient favorable advantages over competitors
that do not receive the same benefits." Christopher J. Coyne & Lotta Moberg, The Political
Economy of State-ProvidedTargetedBenefits, 28 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 337, 348 (2015).
145. MATTHEW D. MITCHELL, THE PATHOLOGY

OF PRIVILEGE:

THE ECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT FAVORITISM 18 (2012) ("When a government grants one
firm a monopoly, however, there is no discipline. The firm will possess pricing power that a
competitive firm lacks. It need not accept the price that would emerge in a competitive market
and is instead said to be a 'price maker.' If the firm is interested in maximizing its profit, it will
set a higher price than that which would prevail in a competitive industry.").
146. See generally Roger A. Kerin et al., First-MoverAdvantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual
Framework, andResearch Propositions,56 J. MKTG. 33, 33 (1992) (providing insight as to the
types of advantages that accrue from entering the market first).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

464

[VOL. 72: 4451

products and services over firms that offer more traditional products and
services.

Making admittance into a sandbox contingent on the novel or innovative
nature of a product or service may be justified on the grounds that more
traditional firms lack the regulatory uncertainty associated with novel and
innovative products or services. It also may make sense because the stated
purpose of many

sandboxes

is to encourage

entrepreneurialism

and

innovation. However, there are countervailing concerns that may outweigh
these justifications.
First, there may be sources of regulatory uncertainty that do not arise from
developments in technology or from the novel nature of a product or service.
In those cases, a firm might benefit from a trial period but still not meet the
entry criteria necessary to gain admittance into a specific sandbox.
Additionally, because a firm admitted into a sandbox can bring its product or
service to market more quickly than its non-admitted rivals, a sandbox may
give admitted firms head starts over their more traditional competitors. For
example, admitted firms could start working on brand creation and developing
customer loyalty by successfully serving customers during the trial, while
their non-admitted counterparts would still be navigating the standard
regulatory process. The longer a firm is allowed to exist within the sandbox's
advantageous regulatory environment, the more pronounced this benefit will
likely be.
In a similar vein, the exposure a firm can gain within the sandbox may
make it easier for that firm to find and obtain investment compared to its nonsandbox rivals. As Jemima Kelly points out in the FinancialTimes Alphaville,

there is a risk that participation in a sandbox becomes a form of governmentprovided public relations for firms lucky enough to gain admittance. 147 If
investors see that a firm has participated in a sandbox, that participation can
signal a number of things. First, it can signal that the firm is engaging in
entrepreneurial and innovative activities to stay ahead of the competition. This
is especially true if regulators restrict sandbox entry to novel products and
services. Second, it can signal that regulators have reviewed the firm and have
found it to be stable and capable of expansion. Likewise, it can signal that
regulators view the firm favorably, or as Hilary Allen insists, it can "lend[]
[the firm] a certain regulatory imprimatur," 148 which can affect an investor's
view of that firm's regulatory liability.

There is also a risk that the regulators behind the sandbox become
government-provided legal or consulting advisers to the accepted firms.
"Informal steers" and other private guidance could allow firms in the sandbox
to obtain a great benefit from the regulator, while a non-sandbox firm would
147. See Kelly, supra note 138.
148. Allen, supranote 13, at 625.
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need to hire a law firm to receive the same guidance. Even then, the nonsandbox firm would lack the certainty provided by getting the answer straight
from the regulator's mouth. This is not to say that it is bad for regulators to
provide guidance and clarity; in fact, it is generally a good thing. But if the
benefit falls unequally onto some participants, it could offer an advantage to
those firms at the expense of others.
Risks of unequal treatment with regard to enforcement also exist to the
extent that the sandbox limits regulatory exposure. For example, the CFPB's
sandbox provides mechanisms for firms to eliminate the risk of liability for
certain activities if the CFPB grants approval relief 149 Although this is not
necessarily objectionable if the firm's conduct is consistent with the law and
should therefore not be subject to liability, the risk is that because firms must
obtain the relief from the CFPB directly and at the CFPB's discretion, firms
may face different liability risks for comparable behavior depending on
whether they went through the sandbox process. This can be a significant
advantage to firms within the sandbox because litigation is a costly and timeconsuming endeavor that can hinder a firm's ability to compete effectively,
even if the firm ultimately prevails.

None of this is to say that regulatory sandboxes are inherently bad or
undesirable. To the extent they facilitate a better understanding of regulation,
more entry, greater competition,

and increased innovation, regulatory

sandboxes can benefit consumers-and that is valuable. However, there are
also potential risks that can detrimentally affect competitors and the market as
a whole.
IV. THE COST OF ECONOMIC PRIVILEGE

As previously discussed, regulatory sandboxes have the potential to
create a form of government-granted economic privilege not enjoyed by
outside firms. 15 0 This is a problem for several reasons. First, it can be
considered unjust for the government to empower certain firms at the expense
of others. When the government engages in the business of picking winners
and losers, it goes against the notions of the rule of law, equal rights, and the
generality principle. 151

149. See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,249
(Sept. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
150. See supra Part III.
151. See Overview - Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educationalresources/educational-activiies/overview-rule-law [https://perma.cc/4C5Q-4VMZ]; Jarret B.
Wollstein, The Idea of Equality, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Apr. 1, 1980),
https://fee.org/articles/the-idea-of-equality/
[https://perma.cc/A4XU-MPHN];
What Is
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Additionally, firm-specific economic privileges distort the market and
undermine its function as a knowledge process. When the government decides
that one firm, or even one industry, should retain some form of advantage over
another, it gives that firm or industry market power it would not otherwise
have. This can make comparatively efficient firms perform worse in the
market than they otherwise would have, while making comparatively
inefficient firms perform better. This result means that firms could succeed or
fail even if consumer preferences would have led to the opposite outcome.
Because individuals rely on these types of market signals to make decisions,
government-granted economic privilege could lead to misallocated resources
as well as forgone profits opportunities for firms and individuals.
Finally, allowing the government to grant privileges to some firms at the
expense of others opens the door for cronyism and favoritism in the regulatory
process. As the political satirist P.J. O'Rourke once quipped: "When buying
and selling are controlled by legislation, the first things to be bought and sold
are legislators." 152 Again, all this is not to say the costs associated with
economic privilege outweigh the benefits that come from the increased
entrepreneurialism and innovation spurred by regulatory sandboxes.
However, these costs do exist. They should be acknowledged and taken into
account when analyzing regulatory sandboxes, and policy makers should
work to find methods and best practices to mitigate them when feasible.
A.

Government-GrantedEconomic PrivilegeIs Unjust

One of the main issues with government-granted economic privilege is
that it goes against basic notions of fairness and justice. 153 Why should a
bureaucrat be in charge of deciding which firms or individuals succeed within
the market? Because of an individual regulator's decision, a firm that might
otherwise be more successful than its competitors may very well perform
poorly. This could lead to some firms succeeding that would have otherwise
failed and some firms failing that would have otherwise succeeded. When
regulators have broad discretion over whether to grant a particular advantage
to a firm, that discretion undermines the underlying notions of the rule of law
and the generality principle.

154

Generality Principle in Political Science?, THE HINDU (Sept. 27, 2018, 23:58),
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/what-is-generality-principle-in-political-science/artic
le25050116.ece [https://perma.cc/WGL7-BK9X].
152. P.J. O'RouRKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES 210 (1992).
153. See generally Michelle Maise, Principles of Justice and Fairness, BEYOND
INTRACTABILITY, https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/principlesof justice [https://per
ma.cc/ARD7-A437] (discussing generally the notions of justice and "fair play").
154. The generality principle was best articulated by the economist James M. Buchanan:
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To be sure that resources are allocated efficiently, individuals and firms
should have as much certainty as possible when making decisions on how they
think they will be regulated. Because of the basic notion of fairness, similarly
situated firms or individuals should not be regulated in highly disparate ways
that heavily favor some firms over others. When regulators are given greater
discretion, individuals' certainty surrounding how they will be regulated
decreases, and market participants may be left to the will of a bureaucrat. In
this situation, similarly situated firms could face remarkably different
regulatory requirements and legal liability. For many individuals, this
disparate treatment may feel intuitively unfair.

Defenders of certain forms of government-granted economic privilege
will likely argue there are good reasons for regulators to support or hinder
certain firms from time to time. The government could be working to address
other issues. It could be working to achieve other goals. Giving certain firms
advantages over others could simply be the inevitable result of an otherwise
completely justifiable government policy. For example, after the 2008
financial crisis, certain banking firms received substantial bailouts while
others did not. 5 However, these actions were justified as a way to stabilize
the U.S. economy. 15 6 As former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy

Geithner said, "It wasn't fair. But it was necessary."" Although that
sentiment may be true and although there may be justifiable reasons for
allowing the government to grant specific firms privileges over their
competitors in certain situations, it does not change the fact that this is unjust.
It may be a necessary evil, but it is still an evil that should be avoided
whenever possible.

[The generality principle is] that which modem politics is not. What we observe is
"politics by interest," whether in the form of explicitly discriminatory treatment
(rewarding or punishing) of particular groupings of citizens or of some elitist-dirigiste
classification of citizens into the deserving and non-deserving on the basis of a
presumed superior wisdom about what is really "good" for us all. The proper principle
for politics is that of generalization or generality.
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT INTEREST:
TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY, at xix (11th ed. 2003).

155. See Bailed Out Banks, CNN MONEY, https://money.cnn.com/news/specials/
storysupplement/bankbailout/ [https://perma.cc/9H7U-4BJN]; Miranda Marquit, Too Big to
FailBanks: WhereAre They Now?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/insights/toobig-fail-banks-where-are-they-now/ [https://perma.cc/DUV5-XKCG].
156. See Kimberly Amadeo, What Was the Bank Bailout Bill? Cost, Impact, How It
Passed, THE BALANCE (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/what-was-the-bankbailout-bill-3305675 [https://perma.cc/6UV3-8784].
157. Press Release, Tim Geithner, Sec'y of Treasury, Remarks at Office of Financial
Stability Town Hall (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg866.aspx [https://perma.cc/U5RM-A9YY].
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Government-GrantedEconomic Privilege Distorts the Market

Another cost associated with government-granted economic privilege is
that it distorts the market's function as a knowledge process. 158 When
consumers decide whether to purchase a particular good or service, they are
signaling to other market participants they have a demand for that good or
service. 159 This process provides information to other market participants on

how likely it is that the good or service is of high quality or, at the very least,
how popular it is among other consumers. 160 In an undistorted market, firms
can only succeed if they are able to establish consumer demand for their
product, which in turn brings in enough revenue to outweigh the cost of doing

business. 16 1 When the government begins granting economic privileges, it
muddles this signaling function and makes it difficult for a consumer or
investor to determine whether a firm's success has been earned in the market
or granted by a government body.
A firm could be doing relatively well, or at least could be perceived as
doing relatively well, even though it would be doing far worse if not for its
government-granted advantage over rivals. This advantage could allow the
firm to bring in more consumers than it naturally would have because of the
reputational boost that comes from its unearned market advantage. As a result,
the firm could drive higher-quality, lower-cost, or more innovative
competitors out of the market, and those competitors might have created more
benefits for consumers and the market in general than their governmentempowered counterpart. Additionally, this advantage could allow a firm to
attract new investors that would not have otherwise invested in the firm.
Investors could see the short-term economic gain enjoyed by the firm as a
result of its unearned economic privilege and choose to invest in that firm over
a competitor that may better in the long run. Investors could also view this
government-granted privilege as the government endorsing certain firms and
not others. Government endorsement is valuable because it signals that a
regulatory body has likely reviewed a firm to some extent. It may also signal
the firm's access to government resources and powers that its competitors
lack. This provides a firm's own type of signaling function that could lead
investors to allocate their resources inefficiently.

158. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
159. See Jim Chappelow, Demand, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.investop
edia.com/terns/d/demand.asp [https://perma.cc/2RF6-KW6N].
160. See Hayek, supra note 158; Chappelow, supra note 159.
161. See Chappelow, supra note 159; Alicia Tuovila, Economic Profit (or Loss),
INVESTOPEDIA (June 27, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economicprofit.asp
[https://perma.cc/VU4R-PX38].
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All this may have a compounding effect in which each benefit that a firm
gains as a result of government-granted economic privilege provides the firm
with more resources or market power, consequently allowing the firm to use
those resources to obtain future benefits. It becomes a cycle of mutual
reinforcement. Additionally, as firms gain more resources, market power, and
political influence through government-granted economic privilege, they are
often able to obtain even more unearned economic privilege through the
political process.
C.

Government-GrantedEconomic Privilege CouldLead to Cronyism

Allowing regulators to grant certain firms economic privilege without

extending that privilege to other firms can create a supply of and demand for
economic privilege. This supply of and demand for government-granted

economic privilege could easily lead to rent-seeking or rent-extracting
behavior. 162 As stated earlier, if a firm is able to obtain a government-granted
economic privilege, this gives the firm an advantage over firms that were not
able to obtain the privilege. Because this advantage has the potential to
provide admitted firms with more market power than they would naturally

have had, the privilege becomes more valuable when it is granted to fewer
firms. A firm that has obtained the privilege will want the number of other

firms that are also granted this privilege to be as small as possible. If firms are
able to obtain the necessary political power, there is good reason to believe
they will attempt to limit regulatory sandbox entry to themselves and,
potentially, the few firms they do business with and benefit from. Regulators,
in turn, could limit access as a way to maximize their ability to extract rent
163
from firms seeking entry.
In 1982, George Stigler won the Nobel Prize in economic sciences for his

work on how regulation is often "captured" by interest groups, industries, or
powerful firms and individuals. 164 He argued that the standard "protection of
the public" theory of regulation did not sufficiently explain how the regulatory
process actually functioned. 165 Instead, he posited that "as a rule, regulation
162. Rent extraction can occur when policy makers, realizing they have the ability to offer
something of value or to impose a cost on market participants, demand rents from those
participants to either provide some form of gain or avoid any potential for harm. See generally
Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction andRent Creation in the Economic Theory ofRegulation,

16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102-03 (1987) (broadly explaining how and why rent extraction comes
to fruition).
163. See id
164. Press Release, The Nobel Prize, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1982 (Oct. 20, 1982), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/1982/press-release/ [https://perma.cc/TAL5-KNBW].
165. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 4 (1971).
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is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit." 166 He went on to say that "every industry or occupation that has
enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry." 167
Further, his theory asserted that even if an industry is not able to obtain
regulation that fully prohibits new entry into the industry, "the regulatory

policy will often be so fashioned as to retard the rate of growth of new
firms."

168

This is because restricting competition and erecting barriers to entry

within an industry help incumbent firms gain a larger share of the market and
greater market power than they would naturally have. 169 Competing with three
other firms is much easier than competing with hundreds. If firms are able to
restrict entry, it will be in their interest to do so.
William A. Jordan further developed this idea in his "producerprotection" theory of regulation. 170 He argued that, regardless of whether it is
the motivating factor, "the actual effect of regulation is to increase or sustain
the economic power of an industry."171 Similar to Stigler, Jordan contrasted
this with what he called the "consumer-protection" theory of regulation. 172 In
Jordan's view, if the producer-protection theory is correct, it is likely that
regulation will have the effect of doing "such things as increasing prices,
promoting price discrimination, reducing or preventing the entry of rival

firms, and increasing industry profits." 17 3 Other scholars have also built upon
this work and supported similar theories that integrate the industry-benefiting
justifications and effects of regulation. 174
As this Article has established, regulatory sandboxes have the potential
to create government-granted economic privilege. 175 If regulators are given

broad discretion to choose which firms are allowed to participate in the
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See id at 7.

170. William A. Jordan, ProducerProtection, PriorMarket Structure and the Effects of

Government Regulation, 15 J.L. &ECON. 151, 152 (1972).
171. Id. at 153.
172. See id. at 152-53.
173. Id. at 153 (footnote omitted).
174. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22,
22 n.3 (1971) ("The 'capture' of regulation by the regulatees is, of course, an old theme in the
literature of regulation. Professor Stigler's theory allows for capture by effective political groups
other than the regulated firms themselves, and there is accordingly no necessary inconsistency
between it and the analysis in this paper."). See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372, 396
(1983) (explaining that Stigler was an influence and providing a model that expands on his
theory); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211,
211-12, 240 (1976) (explaining that Stigler and Jordan were influences and expanding on their
work).
175. See supra Part IV.
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sandbox, they will be able to limit entry as they see fit. Firms that are already
admitted to the sandbox will have a strong desire to see regulators restrict
sandbox entry to the greatest extent possible. Because there is a potential
supply of regulation-arising from regulators' discretion on whether to admit
a firm into the sandbox-and a demand for the regulation-by firms that
would benefit if entry into the sandbox were more heavily restricted-there is
the potential for regulatory capture. If firms are able to use their political
power to have regulators restrict entry into the sandbox, they have a strong
incentive to do so. This is not to say that finrms will necessarily work toward
this end or that regulators will be susceptible to it if they do, but only that this
potential exists and should be considered when designing the procedures
underlying a regulatory sandbox.
V.

HOW TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SANDBOX PRIVILEGE

Acknowledging there is a risk that regulatory sandboxes may create
certain types of harm does not mean that sandboxes should be abandoned.
Instead, when creating sandboxes, policy makers should design them in a way
that will minimize the risk of harm while balancing the benefits to innovation
and entry. And to be clear, the existing sandbox regimes are not blind to these
concerns or tradeoffs. 17 6 This Part looks at existing regimes' proposals to
identify ways to mitigate risk while allowing sandboxes to function.
Generally, these solutions seek to address two core potential sources of
trouble: lack of access and differential treatment.
A.

Lack ofAccess

In a world of few regulatory resources, there is a risk that access to a
sandbox will be limited. The more "high touch" the sandbox experience is,
the more acute this risk is; the more resources a regulator needs to spend on
any given firm, the fewer firms the regulator can service.177 The resulting lack
of access for some firms may place them at an unfair disadvantage, but there
are ways to mitigate this risk to some degree.
The first and most obvious option is simply to grant liberal access by
lowering or eliminating substantive and procedural restrictions. For example,

sandboxes, such as Arizona's, that use novelty as a criterion178 risk excluding
a marginal finrm that is new enough to raise regulatory certainty questions with
176. See ASIC, World-FirstLicensing Exemption, supra note 101; Ariz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 41-5601(4) (Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 2020 54th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-55-103(12)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 5th Spec. Sess.).
177. See UNSGSA, supra note 2, at 31.
178. § 41-5601(4).
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regard to its specific business model while at the same time, not new or unique
enough to qualify as "innovative" in the eye of the regulator. Adopting an
intentionally wide definition of "innovation" could help move more firms into
eligibility. The second option is to consider explicitly whether comparable
firms have previously received entry into the sandbox as a factor weighing in
favor of entry-this helps avoid arbitrary exclusion. 179
The third option, seen in the ASIC's original Fintech Licensing
Exemption, is to have a set of objective criteria related to consumer protection
and allow any firm that meets those criteria to take advantage of the exemption
without the regulator exercising discretion. 180 This option is not without its
own risk that the criteria will be set unnecessarily high or idiosyncratically,
unduly benefiting some firms over others. But it does lower the risk of
arbitrary decision making by the regulator at the admission stage.
Additionally, providing rejected firms with the ability to appeal the
regulator's decision to reject the firm, or at least requiring regulators to
explain why a firm was rejected (as seen in Utah)181 and allowing the firm to
reapply after correcting the defect, may help avoid the risk that admission
decisions become arbitrary or opaque.
The fourth option, seen in the CFPB sandbox, is allowing industry groups
and other third parties to help facilitate sandbox entry on behalf of their
members.18 2 This innovation may help expand access and mitigate
competitive risk by allowing many market participants to benefit from the
sandbox at the same time. However, there are also risks to this approach. First,
industry groups rarely cover the entire competitive landscape, 183 so although
allowing them to apply will help limit the risk of unfair competitive
advantage, it may not eliminate this risk and might instead just shift the
advantage to the industry-group level instead of the firm-specific level.
Second, as the CFPB notes, decisions on whether to grant relief are specific
to facts and circumstances, 184 so it is possible that industry groups may not be
able to provide sufficient specificity to lead to meaningful relief.
Utah and the CFPB also help firms obtain access to the sandbox if they
have competitors that have used the sandbox previously. 185 Although not a
179. Brian Knight, Comment Regarding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's
Proposed No-Action Letter and Product Sandbox Policies, 6 (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www. mercatus.org/publications/financial-regulation/comment-regarding-consumer-fina
ncial-protection-bureaus-proposed [https://perma.cc/BA6D-VKGT].
180. See ASIC, World-FirstLicensing Exemption, supra note 101.

181.
182.
(Sept. 13,
183.

§ 13-55-103(12)(b).
See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,246, 48,254
2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.).
See The GlobalIndustry ClassificationStandard, MCSI, https://www.msci.com/gics

[https://perma.cc/2UB9-WRCE].
184. See Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,251.
185. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
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guarantee of admission, these provisions could help mitigate against the risk
that access to the sandbox becomes a unique advantage for only one market
participant.
In addition to expanding access to participation, regulators and policy

makers should make certain that the duration of the sandbox is no longer than
is necessary to achieve the sandbox's legitimate ends. Allowing a firm to
simply "hang out" in the sandbox's more favorable regulatory environment
would exacerbate the risks of regulatory privilege. This is not to say that
sandbox terms must be objectively short, but they should be tailored to the
specific needs of the regulatory question at hand.
Likewise, regulators should seek to expand access to the learning that
occurs in the sandbox so that, to the extent regulators find themselves acting
as de facto consultants or legal counsel, they do so for the public and market
and not just for a specific firm. Although some regulatory questions will be
tightly wrapped up in the details of a particular business practice such that
they are only valuable to that specific firm, there are likely to be many others
in which the factors, analyses, and determinations created by regulators will
be valuable more broadly. To the greatest extent possible, regulators should
promptly report their findings to the general public without revealing trade
secrets or proprietary information.

Although some sandboxes include periodic reports, such as the FCA's
lessons learned report, 186 so far these reports do not seem to contain a detailed
analysis of the law and regulation. 187 A better analogy may be no-action letters
from agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission that frequently
contain legal and factual analysis.188 Although these no-action letters
technically apply only to the firms that receive them, they are frequently used
to inform other firms' expectations. 189
B.

Differential Treatment

Another risk is that comparable behavior will be treated differently
depending on whether the firm is (or was) in the sandbox. This risk could turn
sandbox participation from being voluntary to de facto mandatory. Such a
situation would be highly undesirable because it would in effect grant
regulators a veto power over who could participate in a market. It would also
impose new regulatory burdens and, given the potential resource limitations
discussed earlier, risk unfairly constricting the entry of new firms.
186. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 60, at 1, 3.

187. See id. at 2.
188. No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersnoactionhtm.html [https://perma.cc/5H7Z-BN8G].
189. Id.
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Although participation in the sandbox may well be evidence of good faith
on the part of a participating firm, failure to participate is not necessarily

evidence of malevolence. Some sandboxes, like the FCA, explicitly
contemplate relaxing certain legal and regulatory requirements. 190 In the
FCA's case, this is consistent with the relevant authorities that the FCA
enjoys, so it cannot be considered outside of or inconsistent with the law, and
the firms that obtain the exemptions or approvals will be entitled to them. 191
However, because firms are required to apply for and receive exemption or

approval from the FCA (rather than just being able to conform to an existing
safe harbor), 192 there is a risk that two firms engaged in the same behavior
would face different liabilities. Although this can arguably be justified as
compensation for cooperating with regulators and providing them with
information, this justification is not entirely satisfying.
Punishment can be justified as being morally just, creating deterrence, or
providing compensation to a harmed party. 193 In the case of a firm operating

within a sandbox in good faith, neither punitive nor deterrence justifications
apply because the firm is not seeking to violate the law, and no one wants to
discourage firms from pursuing innovation with the regulator in a transparent

way. However, a firm that operates in good faith outside of the sandbox also
does not seem to deserve punishment because it is operating in good faith, just
as the sandbox firm is. Moreover, because sandboxes should be voluntary, it
is unclear whether firms should be deterred from avoiding operation in the
sandbox. This leaves limited justification for lower regulatory barriers to and,
most especially, lighter punishment for sandbox firms.
In addition to the risk of de jure disparate treatment between sandbox and
non-sandbox firms, there is also the risk that a de facto enforcement culture
may develop an agency that views sandbox firms as "good" and non-sandbox
firms as "bad." Firms that go through the extra steps to ingratiate themselves
to the regulator and demonstrate tangible good faith may develop a
relationship with the regulator that non-sandbox firms do not enjoy-a
circumstance which might lead to implicit bias when it comes time for
enforcement.
Another risk is that firms using a sandbox will be seen as de facto
endorsed by the regulator. Many existing sandboxes require firms to clearly
state that their participation in the sandbox is not an endorsement on the part
190. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Sandbox Tools, supranote 116.
191. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., How We Authorise, supra note 115; FIN. CONDUCT
AUTH., Enforcement, supra note 115.
192. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX, supra note 35, at 7.
193. See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Justification and Goals, OXFORD

BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0116.xml [https://perma.cc/6NGN-WAKG] (explaining
the justifications for punishment).
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of the regulator. 194 Such clear disclaimers should be broadly adopted to
prevent consumers from conflating experimentation with recommendation.
To address these concerns, the regulator should first acknowledge this
risk and create both formal guidance and informal norms for enforcement staff
to recognize that although participation in the sandbox can be taken as
evidence of good faith, a lack of participation is not necessarily evidence of
bad faith. Second, enforcement staff should clearly understand what justifies
a level of punishment, allowing non-sandbox firms that are comparably acting
in good faith and that stand willing to make harmed customers whole to be
treated similarly to sandbox firms.
VI. CONCLUSION

Sandboxes are exciting developments in the field of regulation. Driven by
a need to keep up with quickly changing technology and a desire to facilitate
innovation and competition, several leading jurisdictions have adopted
sandboxes, with others on the way. 19 5 However, by their very nature,
sandboxes pose a risk to market competition by conferring advantages to some
firms over others. Given how new sandboxes are, it is not surprising that the
literature on this risk is largely underdeveloped.
This Article identifies possible risks and highlights potentially fruitful
areas of future research and scrutiny by academics, policy makers, and others
interested in creating regulatory environments that facilitate innovation and
competition to the benefit of consumers. As more sandboxes are established
and as more firms gain or are denied entry, it will become easier to assess
empirically the extent to which sandboxes serve to benefit the market as a
whole and just those firms fortunate enough to participate. Although the
legitimate benefits to both the market and consumers that are created by welldesigned and well-implemented regulatory sandboxes may supersede the
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